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Abstract 
 
An overemphasis on the tensions between the United States and Britain in the Middle East 
in the 1950s tends to obscure the fact that there also existed a close collaboration between 
them on the intelligence level. The aim of this dissertation, therefore, is to analyse this co-
operation and judge its significance for Anglo-American relations. It will be argued that the 
intelligence co-operation indicates that Suez was neither a breaking point for relations 
between Washington and London nor a watershed for Britain‟s power in the Middle East. 
The analysis of the joint covert action in Syria before and after Suez will support this 
argument. Intelligence co-operation, however, had further implications: It served as effective 
means to forestall Soviet penetration of the Middle East and to deal with anti-Western Arab 
nationalism. Furthermore, it actually allowed the United States to nurture its special 
relationship with Britain and to benefit from the latter‟s influence in the region without 
being associated with the latter‟s reputation as colonialist power. Britain and the United 
States had predominantly converging objectives with regard to the Middle East. Tensions, 
however, arose more over a disagreement over which methods should be used to achieve 
those objectives. 
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I. Introduction 
The Middle Eastern theatre seemed to be one of intense Anglo-American rivalry in the 
1950s, with the United States gradually taking over Britain‟s traditional role as dominant 
power. Yet despite these obvious tensions and conflicts, the United States and Britain had 
in fact a considerable amount of shared interests with regard to the Middle East which 
showed itself in a dimension that was invisible to the public eye: Before and after Suez, the 
American and British intelligence services were in fact planning to change the regime in 
Syria by means of a coup. This, however, was part of a common plan to weaken the 
Egyptian leader Gamal Nasser. Given this knowledge, the strong American opposition to 
the British invasion of Egypt, in collaboration with Israel and France, appears in a different 
light: Actually, Washington shared London‟s wish to see Nasser removed. They did not 
condemn the objective, but the means Britain used to achieve those ends because they 
undermined Anglo-American covert operations in both Egypt and Syria. Covert 
collaboration between the US and Britain, however, had a successful precedent: In 1953, 
the American and British intelligence services instigated a coup that removed the Iranian 
Prime Minister from power. This effectively ended the Iranian Oil Crisis, which – as would 
be the case with Suez three years later – had caused severe friction between London and 
Washington, at least on the public scene. 
The aim of this dissertation, therefore, is to analyse the collaboration on the intelligence 
level and its implications for Anglo-American relations with regard to the Middle East. It 
will be argued that Britain tried to get the United States involved in the region, yet basically 
to ensure its own position. Washington did actually become more active, but it also 
developed an independent approach to Middle Eastern affairs. This, however, lead to 
tensions with London that saw its Great Power status endangered. Yet despite 
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disagreements and tensions, Britain and the United States were closely collaborating, albeit 
covertly, to achieve common interests in the Middle East. The first joint covert action, the 
coup in Iran, helped to establish American influence in the region. Furthermore, it will be 
argued that, when taking covert co-operation into account, the Suez Crisis was neither a 
watershed for Anglo-American relations nor a breaking point for British power in the 
Middle East. The analysis of the joint planning of covert actions in Syria before and after 
Suez will serve to support this argument. The paper will also demonstrate that the 
intelligence co-operation and the employment of covert actions held benefits for the United 
States in two dimension: Firstly, it was a low-risk means to prevent the Soviets from gaining 
influence in the Middle East and to deal with regimes that were dangerously anti-Western. 
Yet apart from that, it secondly allowed the United States to actually foster its relation with 
Britain and to benefit from the latter‟s influence in the region without being associated 
publicly with the latter‟s reputation as colonialist power.  
The nature, quality and significance of Anglo-American relations have been subject to much 
scholarly debate. An evangelic school of thought considers the relations to be special for 
Britain and the United States share a common language, culture and institutions.1 Scholars 
from a functionalist school of thought like Alex Danchev and David Reynolds agree that a 
special relationship had existed since 1940.2 Indeed, the close co-operation established in 
important fields such as defence3 and nuclear technology4 distinguished Anglo-American 
                                                 
1 H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States (London, 1955), George Ball, The Discipline of Power (London, 
1968). 
2 C.J. Bartlett, 'The Special Relationship': A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992), 
John Baylis (ed.), Anglo-American relations since 1939. The enduring alliance  (Manchester; New York, 1997), Alex 
Danchev, 'On Specialness', International Affairs, 72/4 (October, 1996), pp.737-50, Alan P. Dobson, Anglo-
American relations in the twentieth century. (London and New York, 1995), David Reynolds, 'A 'Special 
Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War', International 
Affairs, 62/1 (Winter 1985/6), pp.1-20, David Reynolds, 'Rethinking Anglo-American Relations', International 
Affairs, 65/1 (Winter, 1988-1989), pp.89-111. 
3 John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence relations 1939-1980: The Special Relationship (London, 1981). 
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relations from ordinary partnerships. Yet they argue that common interests rather than 
shared values and sentiments were at the heart of this intimate alliance. Thus, Anglo-
American relations “did not arise naturally from an existential sense of community”5, but 
were often characterised by friction and conflict. Functionalists consider Britain as the 
driving force of the special relationship, whereas they view the United States as more 
sceptical towards it. Reynolds goes as far as to claim that the notion of the „special 
relationship‟ was a mere “device used by a declining power for trying to harness a rising 
power to serve its own ends”6.  
A terminal approach promoted by John Dickie asserts that the fight against the common 
threat of communist expansion brought the United States and Britain closer together. Thus, 
with the end of the Cold War the principal raison d’être of the relationship ceased to exist.7 
This dissertation will follow a functionalist interpretation, arguing that Anglo-American 
relations were not always harmonious, but indeed special with regard to intelligence co-
operation.  
The secret manoeuvres on the American side also reveal that Eisenhower‟s policies had a 
much more complex nature than has previously been acknowledged. Traditionally, 
Eisenhower had been considered as passive President, leaving foreign policy to his Secretary 
of State, John Foster Dulles.8 This view was challenged with the release of previously 
classified government papers and testimonies relating to his presidency. Based on this 
material, scholars like Stephen Ambrose asserted that Ike was not only „liked‟, but that he 
was actually the main architect of American foreign policy and only delegated its 
                                                                                                                                                   
4 John Baylis, 'Exchanging Nuclear Secrets: Laying the Foundations of the Anglo -American Nuclear 
Relationship', Diplomatic History, 25/1 (2001), pp.33-61. 
5 Danchev, 'On Specialness', p.739. 
6 David Reynolds, 'A 'Special Relationship'? Amer ica, Britain and the International Order since the Second 
World War', Ibid.62/1 (Winter 1985/6), pp.1-20, p.2. 
7 John Dickie, 'Special' No More. Anlgo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London, 1994). 
8 Hermann Finer, Dulles over Suez. The Theory and Practice of his Diplomacy  (London, 1964). 
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implementation to Dulles.9 Recent scholarship concurs that Eisenhower had been very 
active, indeed. Yet he was not as benign and as keen to promote peace as he had been 
portrayed. Rather, his foreign policy was more interventionist, with covert operations being 
a key tool in the Cold War.10  
Although the American hand in the overthrow of the Iranian leader Mohammad Mossadeq 
was more or less an open secret from the beginning, an official account written in 1954 by 
Donald Wilber, one of the operation‟s chief planners, has been only disclosed by The New 
York Times in June 2000. The document revealed the last unknown details of American and 
British involvement and is now available online.11 Unfortunately, any official documents on 
the Syrian Operation both on the British and American side remain classified to this date. 
Therefore, my dissertation will mainly be based on diaries and memoirs of the main 
participants of both events in Iran and Syria, as well as on a considerable amount of 
secondary literature that has been produced on the secret side of policy with regard to the 
Middle East. Additionally, the dissertation will benefit from a range of published 
documentary collections.  
Before I will examine the two case studies of joint operations in Iran and Syria, it will first of 
all be necessary to give an overview of the theoretical framework of covert action as an 
element of intelligence and explain why covert action developed as an integral part of 
American strategy in the Cold War. Chapter three will discuss why covert action was 
applied in the Middle Eastern theatre and why Iran became the first target state. Chapter 
four will then give a detailed analysis of the joint operation in Syria. 
                                                 
9 Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984), F. R. Burk, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Hero and 
Politician (Boston, 1986), B.D. Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency and American Foreign Policy  (London 
1969), Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York and Oxford, 1981). 
10 Kevin O'brien, 'Covert Action: The "Quiet Option" in International Statecraft', in Loch K. Johnson and 
James Wirtz (eds.), Intelligence and National Security: The Secret World of Spies (Oxford, 2008), p.24. 
11 Donald N. Wilber, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran: November 1952-August 1953 (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1954), available at <http://cryptome.org/cia-iran-all.htm>, accessed 1 September 2008. 
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II. Covert Action  
II.1. Covert action in the studies of intelligence 
More than twenty years ago, intelligence has been described as the “missing dimension of 
most diplomatic history”1. Since then, Intelligence Studies, a subfield of International 
Relations, developed steadily, greatly facilitated by the declassification of important 
documents on part of the United States and Britain in the 1980s, and, more recently, the 
former Soviet Union and the states of the former Eastern bloc. Analysing the features of 
intelligence and its implications for both the domestic policy -making process as well as inter-
state relations contributed significantly to an enhanced understanding especially of the 
nature and the origins of the Cold War.2 Yet while the pre-dominantly archive-based 
literature on the intelligence side of events has increased considerably, “[t]he specific subject 
of covert action as an element of intelligence”, as Elizabeth Anderson laments, “has suffered 
from a deficiency of serious study”3. Covert action, according to the Central Intelligence 
Agency‟s own definition is “[a]n operation designed to influence governments, events, 
organizations, or persons in support of foreign policy in a manner that is not necessarily 
attributable to the sponsoring power”4. In general, four types of covert actions can be 
distinguished: propaganda, economic, political and paramilitary operations.5  
Covert action, or „special political action‟ as it is called in Britain, is primarily carried out by 
the intelligence services. As the National Security Council concluded in 1947, this is mainly 
due to practical reasons:  
                                                 
1 Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds.), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities 
in the Twentieth Century (London, 1984), p.1. 
2 Len Scott and Peter Jackson, 'The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice', Intelligence and National 
Security, 19/2 (2004), pp.139-69. 
3 Elizabeth Anderson, 'The Security Dilemma and Covert Action: The Truman Years', International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 11/4 (1998), pp.403-27, p.403. 
4 CIA, Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence (Washington DC, 1995), p.38, quoted in David F. Rudgers, 'The Origins 
of Covert Action', Journal of Contemporary History, 35/2 (2000), pp.249. 
5 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, 2003), pp.129-31. 
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“[T]he similarity of operational methods involved in covert 
psychological and intelligence activities and the need to ensure 
their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders the Central 
Intelligence Agency the logical agency to conduct such 
operations.”6 
 
The question whether covert action should be considered as part of intelligence, however, is 
subject to controversial academic debate. Although there is no consensus as to a definition 
of intelligence7, it has been argued by scholars like Michael Herman that its ultimate goal is 
to inform political leader and to reduce uncertainty.8 Peter Jackson, on the other hand, has 
argued that intelligence should be considered as “tool to guide policy” as much as a “tool for 
the implementation of policy”9. Thus, covert action forms an integral part of intelligence. It is 
in that sense that I will refer to covert action and intelligence in the coming chapters.  
 
II.2. Covert action in the Cold War 
The United States were latecomers in the intelligence business with the first independent 
intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), being established only after the 
shock of Pearl Harbor. The OSS was designed after the British model and developed a close 
cooperation with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) during the war. In fact, the 
OSS benefited from the expertise of SIS10 which had been set up in 1909 and had since 
then comprised a section responsible for special operations.11 OSS and SIS jointly engaged 
                                                 
6 Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter: FRUS) 1945-1950, NSC memorandum, 17 December 1947, 
pp.649-51. 
7 David Kahn, 'An Historical Theory of Intelligence', Intelligence and National Security, 16/3 (2001), pp.79-92. 
8 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge, 1996), pp.55-56. 
9 Peter Jackson, 'Historical Reflections on the Uses and Limits of Intelligence', in Peter Jackson and Jennifer 
Siegel (eds.), Intelligence and Statecraft: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence in International Society (Westport, 2005), 
p.12.  
10 SIS actually was the senior partner at the beginning of the Anglo -American intelligence alliance, see Stephen 
Dorril, MI6. Fifty Years of Special Operations (London, 2000), pp.49-57. 
11 Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence Community  (London, 1986). 
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in sabotage, espionage, covert action and subversion against the axis powers. However, the 
OSS was disbanded as soon as the guns fell silent.12 Slowly acknowledging the potential 
Soviet threat, the United States created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947. 
However, the first peace-time intelligence agency initially was limited to collecting and 
analysing intelligence.13  
The Kremlin, by contrast, had plenty of experience with clandestine operations. The 
Committee for State Security, better known as KGB as it was called from 1954, and its 
predecessors had been operating at home and abroad for nearly thirty years.14 Yet George F. 
Kennan, the „father‟ of the containment policy, recognised the need to supplement overt 
means to counter Soviet expansion like the Marshall Plan or the Truman Doctrine with 
covert ones. In his famous “Long Telegram” Kennan had argued that Moscow‟s hostility 
towards the Western camp stemmed from nothing the West had done, but was a domestic 
necessity to justify the totalitarian regime.15 Therefore, it would be futile to employ 
traditional diplomatic means to achieve an understanding with Moscow. Military means, on 
the other hand, would be inappropriate. Yet something needed to be done to contain Soviet 
expansionism.16  
Covert operations, as Loch K. Johnson puts it, became a valuable “„third option‟ between 
diplomacy and open warfare”17. Kennan himself wrote the directive that formally ordered 
                                                 
12 Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only. Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington 
to Bush (New York, 1995), pp.159-61. 
13 National Secur ity Act  1947 in Leary, William (ed.) The Central Intelligence Agency. History and Documents, 
(Alabama, 1984), p.129. 
14 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB. The Ins ide Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to 
Gorbachev (London, 1990), Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II.  The KGB and 
the World (London, 2005). 
15 Kennan to Secretary of State, 22 February 1946, FRUS, 1946, VI, 696-709. 
16 George F. Kennan, 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct ', Foreign Affairs, 25 (July 1947), pp.566-82. 
17 Loch K. Johnson, America’s Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society  (New York, 1989), p.17. 
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the CIA to engage in covert actions.18 Initially focussing on Europe to prevent communist 
subversion, the CIA began to expand its clandestine operations into the Third World with 
the onset of the Korean War.19  
Covert interventions in the affairs of third countries to further the interests of the American 
government can doubtlessly be considered an aggressive act. However, this paper will not 
touch upon the historiographical debate whether American foreign policy in the early Cold 
War years was a defensive response to Soviet expansionist ambitions20 or whether they went 
beyond pure containment and actually increased the insecurity of the USSR, which then 
had to respond.21 All interpretations, orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist22, however, 
view the Cold War itself merely as a bi-polar conflict. Yet especially with regard to the 
Middle East, Odd Arne Westad‟s recent approach encompassing other paradigms like 
ideology, technology and the Third World as factors shaping the Cold War seems very 
promising for the understanding of the conflict.23 While bearing these paradigms in mind, 
the following chapters will however concentrate on Anglo-American relations with regard to 
the Middle East, thus leaving out the issue of inter-Arab rivalry. 
 
 
                                                 
18 NSC 10/2, in FRUS, 1945-1950, pp.713ff. 
19 Rudgers, 'Origins of Covert Action', pp.249-62. 
20 George Frost Kennan, American diplomacy, 1900-1950 (London, 1952), Arthur Schlesinger Jr, „Origins of the 
Cold War‟ Foreign Affairs, 46, October, 1967, pp. 22-52. 
21 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, 1962). 
22 The post-revisionist approach tried to generate a more balanced view, based on archival material from both 
the Western powers as well as the former Soviet Union. The leading post-revisionist, John Lewis Gaddis, 
however, tended to  return to the traditional view and attributed the „blame‟ for the origins of  the Cold War to 
the Soviet Union. see John Lewis Gaddis, We now know. Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997).  
23 Odd Arne Westad, 'The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms', Diplomatic 
History, 24/4 (Fall 2000), pp.551-65. 
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III. Iran 1953 
III.1. Anglo--American interests in the Middle East 
Britain had established its status as paramount power in the Middle East after the First 
World War. The region, linking Africa, Asia and Europe, formed an important nodal point 
for communications and transport. More importantly, the British economy increasingly 
depended on the region‟s rich oil reserves.1 Considerably weakened by the Second World 
War, the United Kingdom faced serious problems to maintain its Great Power status. 
Particularly the loss of India in 1947 was a bitter pill to swallow and increased fears among 
Britain‟s elites that the United Kingdom might be reduced to a third-rate power. In the 
Middle East, however, Britain still held a dominant position. Thus, London determined the 
region to become the “new keep and stronghold”2 of the Empire.  
For the United States, the Middle East was a low priority before the Second World War. 
This, however, changed with the Iranian crisis in 1946, when Moscow refused to withdraw 
its troops from Iran as stipulated in the Yalta agreement. Furthermore, the Kremlin 
encouraged rebels to proclaim the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and Kurdish 
Republic in north-western Iran, which held rich oil reserves.3 Eventually, Stalin had to give 
in to international pressure and withdrew in March 1947. But in view of the perceived 
expansionist policies of the Soviet Union, the United States began to consider the Middle 
East to be “vital” for their own security. 4 Especially in light of the communist victory in 
China and the onset of the Korean War, Iran became of significant strategic importance for 
the defence of the Middle East. If Iran fell under communist rule, the Soviet Union‟s 
                                                 
1 Ovendale, Transfer of Power. p.4. 
2 Reynolds, ''Special Relationship'', p.6.  
3 William J. Daugherty, 'Truman's Iranian Policy, 1945-1953: The Soviet Calculus', International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 15/4 (2002), pp.580-93, Mark J. Gasiorowski, 'U.S. Foreign Policy Toward 
Iran During the Mussadiq Era', in David W. Lesch (ed.), The Middle East and the United States. A Historical and 
Political Reassessment (Boulder, Colorado, 2003), p.52. 
4 NSC 5, FRUS, 1948, IV, p.2. 
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position in a global war would be significantly enhanced due to the access to Iran‟s oil and 
its geo-strategic location bordering Turkey, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.5 Yet despite having upgraded the status of the Middle East to “vital”, the United 
States were reluctant to make any military commitments.6 In the event of war, the United 
Kingdom was considered to be solely responsible to defend the Middle East.  
London, however, in view of its economic strains, was incapable of holding the region in a 
prolonged war without the help of the United States.7 Albeit being suspicious of “American 
commercial penetration into the Middle East” 8, the Labour government under Clement 
Attlee recognised as early as October 1945 that US economic, military as well as political 
assistance would be indispensable for the UK in order to maintain its position, which was 
increasingly endangered by a rising tide of Arab nationalism. Therefore, London wanted an 
open celebration of the „special relationship‟ to send a signal to the Arab nations that 
America would support Britain in any dispute. 9  
Washington, however, increasingly concerned about Soviet penetration of the Middle East, 
began to act more independently. This, however, caused stern tensions between London 
and Washington during the Oil Crisis in Iran. As will be demonstrated below, Britain and 
America had different priorities with regard to Iran, which led them to view the situation in 
the country in different ways. Nevertheless, their common effort to topple Mossadeq 
indicates that their aims were converging in general. 
 
                                                 
5 This is d iscussed especially in NSC 54, 21 July 1949 in FRUS , 1949, VI, pp.545-555. 
6 The inconsistent American foreign policy towards the Middle East was ma inly due to the schism between 
State and Defence Departments. While the former argued that the US should increase its support for the 
region so as not to lose it to communism, the latter feared an over -extension of American capabilities and 
argued to de-prioritise the region. see Steve Marsh, Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil. Crisis in Iran  
(London and New York, 2003), p.25.  
7 Ritchie Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, 1998), p.101. 
8 CAB 128/1, CM 38 (45)6, 4 October 1945, reprinted in Hyam (ed.), Labour and the End of Empire, pp.2-4. 
9 Marsh, Crisis  in Iran, p .27. 
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III.2. The Oil dispute 
At the end of the 1940s, public discontent began to arise in Iran over the unjust 
distribution of the profits of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Dr. Mohammad 
Mossadeq, the most prominent nationalist politician, further heated up the debate about 
the oil industry by demanding its outright nationalisation. When he became Prime Minister 
in April 1951, he eventually passed a bill through the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, 
nationalising AIOC.10 The British government, which owned 50 percent of the company,11 
were outraged by this decision. The AIOC refinery in Abadan, an offshore island in the 
Persian Gulf, was the “single largest overseas asset and a source of national pride” 12. 
Britain‟s ailing economy was also in desperate need of the oil revenues. His Majesty‟s 
Government was seriously contemplating to invade the Abadan Island to seize the refinery 
and the nearby oilfields.13  
The United States, however, strongly opposed the use of force unless in a case of a 
communist revolution, a Soviet military attack or when necessary to protect the lives of 
British nationals.14 Washington feared that an unprovoked military intervention would 
constitute the perfect pretext for the Soviet Union to send troops to Azerbaijan and to 
sponsor a take-over by the Iranian communist party, the Tudeh. According to the Soviet-
Iranian Friendship Treaty of 1921, the USSR was entitled to intervene in the event of an 
                                                 
10 The Shah approved Mossadeq‟s Premiership on 29 April and the nationalisation bill on 1 May. see 
Gasiorowski, 'U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iran', p.54.  
11 Steve Marsh argues that the lines between AIOC and the British government were rather blurred with t he 
latter having more responsibility for the company‟s performance during the oil crisis than had previously been 
acknowledged. see Marsh, Crisis in Iran, p.4. 
12 Wm. Roger Louis, 'Britain and the Overthrow of the Mosaddeq Government', in Mark J. Gasiorowski and 
Malcolm Byrne (eds.), Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (New York, 2004), p.129. 
13 H.W. Brands, 'The Cairo-Teheran Connection in Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East, 1951-53', The 
International History Review, XI/3 (August, 1989), pp.434-56.  
14  NSC 107/2 in FRUS, 1952-1954, X. pp.71-76, Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State 
Department (New York, 1969), p.506. 
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attack on Iran by a third party.15 The British government, however, concluded that “[t]he 
risk of Russia occupying Northern Persia might be worth accepting provided that we 
retained full control of the Abadan refinery”16. In any case, it was considered unlikely that 
the Soviet Union would escalate the situation into a global war. American officials, by 
contrast, estimated that the situation might easily lead to a global confrontation with the 
USSR – a scenario that had to be avoided under all circumstances. Thus, they were shocked 
that their British counterparts would rather take this risk than lose control over the oil. 
Eventually, the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee gave in to American pressure and 
refrained from military action.  
Anglo-American relations became increasingly strained during the oil dispute. London and 
Washington had divergent interpretations of what was actually happening in Iran, which, 
subsequently, led them to pursue different policies. The American National Security 
Council regarded an unprovoked military intervention by the USSR as “unlikely”, yet 
nevertheless warned that the latter “will continue to apply strong political and psychological 
pressures against Iran”17. Thus, a communist coup à la Czechoslovakia presented a real 
danger. For the United States, Dr. Mossadeq and his National Front seemed to be the ideal 
“bulwark” against communist subversion.18 He enjoyed a wide popularity in Iran and was 
known to distrust both the Tudeh and the USSR.19 Americans accused the British of failing 
to deal adequately with the irrevocable trend of nationalist movements, thus risking driving 
them into the hands of the Soviets. 
 
                                                 
15 Article 6 of Irano-Soviet Treaty of 1921 reprinted in FRUS, 1952-1954, X, p.889. 
16 CAB 129/46, CP (51) 212, Cabinet Meeting on 20 July 1951, cited from: Ronald Hyam (ed.), The Labour 
Government and the End of Empire, 1945-1951, Part I High Policy and Administration (London, 1992), pp.91-93. 
17 Study Prepared by the Staff of the National Security Council, undated, in FRUS, 1952-1954, X, pp.11-21. 
18 Gasiorowski, 'U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iran', p.55.  
19 James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New York, 1988), pp.53-57, 
Louis, 'Overthrow of Mosaddeq', p.128. 
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For London, however, Mossadeq was an anti-British fanatic rather than a nationalist. The 
British Ambassador Shepherd described him as “demagogue” and “lunatic”, who wept in 
public, pretended to faint during speeches in the Majlis and preferred to negotiate in 
pyjamas whilst sitting in bed.20 In contrast to their American colleagues, British officials 
were convinced that Mossadeq‟s downfall would not necessarily lead to a communist 
takeover21 and began to exert economic pressure on Iran. By September 1951, the United 
Kingdom had practically installed a blockade that prevented Iran from selling its oil on the 
world market.22  
Yet British officials were annoyed about “the extent to which Mossadeq was being aided in 
the oil dispute by a United States policy of „neutrality‟” 23. Instead of firmly siding with its 
ally, the United States urged both Iran and Britain to settle their differences. In July 1951, 
President Truman sent special envoy W. Averell Harriman to Tehran to mediate an 
agreement.24 Harriman‟s team managed to persuade the Iranian Prime Minister to resume 
talks with Britain. However, Mossadeq reject the new proposal offered to him by the British 
negotiation mission under the leadership of Richard Stokes in August 1951.25  
In September 1951, when British workers were forced to leave the oilfields, the Attlee 
government again considered a military invasion.26 Yet again, the US President strongly 
opposed such a step. Convinced that Mossadeq was “anxious to achieve an agreement”27, 
                                                 
20 Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, The United States, and 
Postwar Imperialism (Oxford, 1984), pp.652-62. 
21 Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of S ir Anthony Eden (London, 1960), p.201. 
22 For a detailed analysis of the economic dimension of the oil dispute see Mary Ann Heiss, 'The International 
Boycott of Iranian Oil and the Anti-Mosaddeq Coup of 1953', in Mark Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne 
(eds.), Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (New York, 2004). 
23 Eden, Full Circle, p.200. 
24 For the Harriman Mission, see FRUS, 1952–1954, X, pp. 92–152. 
25 Mark J. Gasiorowski, 'The 1953 Coup d'État in Iran', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 19/3 (August 
1987), pp. 261-86, p.263. 
26 Attlee to Truman, Telegram dated 25 September, r eprinted in FRUS, 1952-1954, X, pp.167-169; Acheson, 
Present at the Creation, p.510. 
27 Gasiorowski, '1953 Coup', p.264. 
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Truman insisted on the British to resume negotiations. In October, the issue was brought to 
the Security Council of the United Nations, where Mossadeq presented his case. During his 
stay in the United States, the Iranian Prime Minister met regularly with Assistant Secretary 
of State for Near Eastern Affairs George McGhee who tried to find a balanced compromise 
to the oil dispute.28 Mossadeq also travelled to Washington where he was warmly welcomed 
by President Truman.29 
By this time, however, Anglo-American relations had severely suffered from the oil dispute. 
British politicians resented the lack of support of its ally30 and judged that the United States 
was “excessively catastrophic in its appreciation of the Iranian situation”31. American 
officials, on the other hand, termed the British Iran policy a “disaster”32 and some even 
recommended a greater distance from Britain in Middle Eastern affairs. 
The United States were eager to find a solution to the oil dispute as fast as possible because 
they feared that an economic breakdown of the country might eventually lead to a 
communist takeover. Washington recognised both Iran‟s right to nationalise and Britain‟s 
right for just compensation and sincerely believed that an agreement could be reached 
satisfying both parties. Yet the British and Iranian positions remained far apart. Although 
British officials publicly stated that the principle of nationalisation would be accepted 
provided compensation was paid,33 they actually insisted on retaining control of the oil 
fields.34 For it was considered to be “not possible to do business with him”35 anyway, and 
                                                 
28 For a full account of the negotiations talks see George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World. Adventures in 
Diplomacy (New York, 1983), pp.388-404. 
29 Memorandum of Conversation between President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson and Mossadeq, 
Washington, 23 October 1951, in FRUS , 1952-1954, X, pp.241-244. 
30 Marsh, Crisis  in Iran, p .67, Louis, British Empire, p.664. 
31 Private conversation between British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins and Paul Nitze after meeting of US and 
UK officials on January 17, 1952, in FRUS, 1952-54, X,  pp.327-8. 
32 Grady to DOS, 27 August 1951, in FRUS, 1952–1954, X, p.149. 
33 CAB 128/20, CM 51(51)2, in Hyam (ed.), Labour and the End of Empire, pp.87-90. 
34 Therefore, the newly-elect Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden rejected the proposal prepared by McGhee and 
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convinced that Mossadeq‟s tenure in power would not last long, His Majesty‟s Government 
preferred to await a successor government which would be more willing to settle the matter.  
The Iranian Prime Minister, on the other hand, questioned the very basis for any 
compensation claims by arguing that the 1933 agreement was illegal and immoral.36 
Mossadeq‟s intransigence increasingly exasperated American officials. Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson lamented that “Mossadeq, too, was whirling like a dervish. One day he 
would appear to offer arbitration or compensation; the next, to withdraw his offer”37. 
 
During the following months, Mossadeq‟s behaviour became increasingly erratic and 
unpredictable. He started negotiations on the sale of oil with the USSR in early 1952 and 
began to call for Iran‟s neutrality in the Cold War.38 In July 1952, he assumed near-
dictatorial rights by appointing himself Minister of Defence, thus reducing the Shah‟s 
authority as commander in chief.39 
By then, American officials began to voice doubts about the mental stability of Mossadeq40 
and came to the conclusion that he was unwilling to end the oil dispute any time soon. 
Thus, Washington was gradually departing from its position as „honest broker‟ and moved 
closer to the British view. In August 1952, President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill 
jointly presented another proposal to Mossadeq, which was yet again rejected a month 
later.41 In November, the National Security Council explicitly recommended that the 
United States should “[a]void unnecessarily sacrificing legitimate United Kingdom interests 
                                                                                                                                                   
Mossadeq, see Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, 4 November 1951, in FRUS, 1952-1954, X, pp.256-58. 
35 Professor Ann K.S. (Nancy) Lambton quoted in Dickie, 'Special' No More, p.69.  
36 Louis, 'Overthrow of Mosaddeq', p.129.  
37 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p.679. 
38 Henderson to DOS, 19 January 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, X, pp.334-335. 
39 Dorril, MI6, p .572, Marsh, Crisis in Iran, pp.114-16. 
40 Hender son to DOS, 28 July 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, X, p.416-421.  
41 For details on the proposal see Ibid., pp.469-474. 
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or unnecessarily impairing United States-United Kingdom relations”42. In the following 
months, London and Washington began to co-operate even more closely and combined 
their efforts in a secret operation to end the oil dispute – by removing Prime Minister 
Mossadeq. 
 
III.3. From Conflict to Collaboration: Operation AJAX 
The United Kingdom launched a „special political action‟ to unsettle Mossadeq as early as 
July 1951, only two months after the nationalisation bill became law in Iran. The plan was 
based on the analysis and recommendation of Professor Ann Lambton, a leading expert in 
contemporary Iranian affairs who enjoyed wide influence within the Foreign Office. 
Professor Lambton assured that there was a considerable part of the Iranian population 
which opposed Mossadeq‟s nationalisation programme and “whose ideas of the Iranian 
national interest coincided with the British conception”43. But in view of the prevailing anti-
British sentiments that Dr. Mossadeq and his National Front had stirred up, it would have 
been futile for those Iranians to openly side with Britain. Therefore, they would need to 
collaborate secretly with Britain to bring about a change of government. Robert Zaehner, 
who was appointed by Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison himself to orchestrate the 
overthrow of Mossadeq44, began cultivating a large network of influential Iranians, with the 
Rashidian brothers being by far the most valuable collaborators.45 According to Donald 
Wilber, the Rashidians held contacts “in such fields as the armed forces, the Majlis, 
                                                 
42 “United States Policy Regarding the Present Situation in Iran”, NSC 136/1, 20 November 1952, full text 
available online at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/iran521120.pdf . 
43 Louis, British Empire, p.659. 
44 Thus, the British Foreign Office was more closely entangled with SIS and covert operations than their 
American counterpart was with the CIA, see Louis, 'Overthrow of Mosaddeq', p.132. 
45 C.M. Woodhouse, Something Ventured (London, 1982), p.118. 
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religious leaders, the press, street gangs, politicians, and other influential figures”46. After 
Mossadeq finally terminated diplomatic relations with Britain in October 1952, American 
assistance became essential for the success of the plot to unsettle the Iranian Prime Minister. 
Thus, Christopher „Monty‟ Woodhouse, the Chief MI6 officer in Teheran, travelled to 
Washington in mid-November to present his plan and asked for American support: 
“Not wishing to be accused of trying to use the Americans to 
pull British chestnuts out of the fire, I decided to emphasize the 
Communist threat to Iran rather than the need to recover control 
of the oil industry. I argued that even if a settlement of the oil 
dispute could be negotiated with [Mossadeq], which was 
doubtful, he was still incapable of resisting a coup by the Tudeh 
Part, if it were backed by Soviet support. Therefore he must be 
removed. [...] The plan which came with me to Washington was 
called, rather too obviously, Operation Boot”47. 
 
In fact, the United States had themselves been carrying out covert actions in Iran since the 
late 1940s. In addition to organising networks for guerrilla warfare in the event of war with 
the Soviet Union, cross-border espionage and subversion operations, the CIA had also 
launched a propaganda and political action operation code-named BEDAMN. However, the 
CIA efforts were not directed against Mossadeq, but to counter Soviet subversion and to 
reduce the influence of the Tudeh party.48  
By the end of 1952, however, Washington had lost all hope that Mossadeq would be an 
effective „bulwark‟ against the communists. The National Security Council estimated in late 
November 1952 that a communist takeover is unlikely in the near future, but warned that 
“if present trends in Iran continue unchecked, Iran could be effectively lost to the free 
world in advance of an actual communist takeover of the Iranian Government. Failure to 
                                                 
46 Wilber, Overthrow, p.7. 
47 Dorril, MI6, p .583, Woodhouse, Something Ventured, p.118. 
48 Gasiorowski, '1953 Coup', p.269. 
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arrest present trends in Iran involves a serious risk to the national security of  the United 
States”49. Particularly alarming was the fact that key allies had left Mossadeq‟s coalition and 
were working against him. By mid-February 1953, Mossadeq was largely depended on the 
support of Tudeh. His continued refusal to settle the oil dispute would further deteriorate 
the economic situation in Iran and the US feared that the Tudeh party might take 
advantage of popular unrests. 50 Thus, during the summer and autumn of 1952, American 
officials began contemplating covert operations. NSC 136/1, which Truman approved on 
20 November, called for “special political operations”51 in the event of an attempted or 
actual communist coup. The document explicitly states that “[e]ffective liaison with the 
United Kingdom should be maintained with respect to such operations”52. 
The final decision for an Anglo-American operation to remove Mossadeq, however, was 
delayed due to the impending change of administration after Eisenhower won the 
presidential elections in November 1952. On 3 February 1953, two weeks after Ike‟s 
inauguration, American and British officials decided to co-operate in the overthrow of the 
Mossadeq regime.53 CIA and MI6 worked closely on the development of the plan, which 
was given its final approval by Eisenhower and the State Department on the one hand and 
the British Foreign Office on the other hand in mid-July 1953. Kermit „Kim‟ Roosevelt, 
Chief of the CIA‟s Near East and Africa Division, was appointed to lead Operation AJAX, 
as the former British operation Boot had been re-christened.54  
The most difficult part for Roosevelt proved to be convincing the Shah to participate in the 
coup. The original plan required him to sign royal decrees, so-called firmans; one dismissing 
                                                 
49 NSC 136/1.  
50 Mark J. Gasiorowski, 'The 1953 Coup D'État Against Mosaddeq', in Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm 
Byrne (eds.), Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (New York, 2004), pp.230-33. 
51 NSC 136/1, p.4, Paragraph 5(c). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for  the Control of Iran (New York, 1979), pp.120-24. 
54 Wilber, Overthrow, pp.iv-vii. 
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Mossadeq and one appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi, whom the British and Americans 
had chosen to become Iran‟s new Prime Minister. The Shah finally signed the firmans on 15 
August, but details of the plot were leaked to Mossadeq. The military official who was to 
deliver the royal decrees was arrested the same night. On 16 August, Mossadeq announced 
publicly that a coup against his government had been attempted. During the day, forces 
loyal to Mossadeq established control over the city and arrested leading army figures and 
other persons suspected of participating in the coup.55  
The Shah fled the country the same day – without informing the CIA. Operation AJAX 
seemed to have gone terribly wrong. For the next two days, Tehran was in chaos, with 
Tudeh mobs taking to the streets, tearing down the Shah‟s statutes and demanding the end 
of his reign.56 Nevertheless, Roosevelt and his team, after the initial setback, began to 
improvise. It seems quite probable that the above-mentioned Tudeh demonstrations were 
originally organised by the CIA in order provoke fears of a Communist revolution which, it 
was hoped, would trigger a counter-reaction by Iranians hostile to communism.57 In any 
case, the CIA orchestrated the counter-demonstration against the Tudeh crowd, which by 
then had been joined by genuine party members.58 The street fighting lasted for nine hours 
and caused over three hundred casualties. Eventually, Mossadeq surrendered after his 
troops were defeated by the pro-Shah mob.59 
 
                                                 
55 Ibid., pp.44-50. 
56 Woodhouse, Something Ventured, pp.128-29. 
57 There is, however, no documentary evidence for this claim. Gasiorowski has obtained this infor mation from 
interviews with several CIA officials involved in the coup, see Gasiorowski, '1953 Coup', p.275,fn.66. 
58 The crowds were led by members of exercise clubs. They had, according to Koch, probably been activated by 
the Rashidian brothers and were extremely effective in rallying the masses behind the Shah. see Scott A. Koch, 
"Zendebad, Shah!" The Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953 
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59 For a comprehensive account of the coup see Gasiorowski, 'Coup d'État Aga inst Mosaddeq', Stephen 
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III.4. Outcome 
The Shah returned the following day and was received by a cheering crowd. He promptly 
appointed Zahedi Prime Minister and the oil dispute was finally settled in late 1954. The 
nationalisation was reversed, but the monopoly of AIOC, subsequently renamed British 
Petroleum (BP), was not re-established either. Instead, an international petroleum 
consortium was set up in which American companies and BP each held a 40 percent 
share.60 
Washington‟s pressure on London during the oil crisis and the fact that its settlement 
opened the Iranian oil market to American companies led Without doubt, relations 
between London and Washington were difficult and tense during the oil crisis. Yet both 
powers were well aware of their interdependence not only in the Middle East, but as allies 
in the global Cold War. Secretary of State Dean Acheson reminded Secretary of Defence 
Robert Lovett, who had raised doubts about the necessity of Anglo-American relations, that 
“the United Kingdom is the most important element of strength in the Western alliance 
outside of the United States. [...] The objective of our policy must be to save Iran without 
unnecessarily damaging our relations with the United Kingdom”61.  
As outlined above, Britain and America had different priorities with respect to Iran. Their 
interests in general, however, were astonishingly similar: Both acknowledged that the 
Soviets had to be prevented from gaining a foothold in Iran, that the access to oil had to be 
secured for the economic recovery of Western Europe and that it was necessary to protect 
the sanctity of contracts.62 Without a comparable degree of convergence, the intelligence co-
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operation between Britain and the United States in the overthrow of Mossadeq would not 
have been conceivable. Although Operation AJAX itself was primarily executed by the CIA, 
the plan had been elaborated by British and American intelligence officials.63 The CIA also 
greatly benefited from the network of agents that MI6 had previously established in Iran. 64  
 
After Mossadeq‟s fall, Iran was safely integrated in the Western Orbit. Operation AJAX had 
been an effective means to end the oil dispute without risking to invoke the Soviet-Iranian 
Friendship treaty – the very model of a “third” option. The Shah told Roosevelt in private “I 
owe my throne to God, my people, my army – and to you”65. Yet the actual impact of the 
covert action on the events in Iran is debatable. Barry Rubin claims that “[o]verthrowing 
[Mossadeq] had been like pushing on an already-opened door”66. Indeed, the political 
climate in Iran was inherently unstable at this time. However, the internal history prepared 
by the CIA‟s history staff in 1998 claims that the fall of Mossadeq would not have been 
possible without outside help to the opposition groups.67  
There has, however, been considerable scholarly debate as to why the United States 
eventually decided to engage in this venture. Some have argued that the decision was 
primarily motivated by the close relationship between the Eisenhower administration and 
oil companies.68 Others have stressed Eisenhower‟s more assertive policy to counter Soviet 
expansion. Since the decision to overthrow Mossadeq was reached shortly after Ike‟s 
inauguration, it seems that he was more willing to use covert operation than his 
                                                 
63 For details of the planning see Wilber, Overthrow, pp.5-11. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Roosevelt, Countercoup, p.199. 
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predecessor.69 However, when official documents from the period 1952 to 1954 became 
available, scholars identified more elements of continuation than of change between the 
two administrations with regard to Iran.70  
Britain, on the other hand, has been portrayed to have abused the notion of the special 
relationship in order to secure American support for its own imperial ends.71 With regard to 
covert action, however, the claim that London had „tricked‟ Washington into the secret 
endeavour to topple Mossadeq seems rather doubtful. As outlined above, American officials 
began themselves to consider covert action long before Woodhouse asked for US assistance 
in early November.  
With Operation AJAX, the United States had for the first time committed themselves to 
intervene in Middle Eastern affairs. Undeniably, they subsequently began to establish 
themselves as the major Western power in the region. Britain was increasingly pushed into 
the role of a junior partner – a process accompanied with tensions and conflicts. 
Nevertheless, United States did not intend to fully replace Britain in the Middle East. As 
will be seen in the coming chapter, Washington was more interested in power-sharing than 
hegemony.72 Co-operation on the intelligence level was part of the glue that kept Anglo-
American relations together. 
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IV. Syria 1956-1957 
IV.1. Syria as target for covert action 
The United States and Britain shared a common interest with regard to Syria: To prevent 
the country from falling under communist rule. Syria, which gained independence from 
France in 1945, hosted numerous left-wing political organisations and was thus considered 
as especially vulnerable to Soviet influence.1 
In March of the following year, the CIA helped orchestrating a military coup that brought 
Army Chief of Staff Husni Zaim to power.2 Zaim, whom American officials considered to be 
a “„Banana Republic‟ dictator type” who “did not have the competence of a French 
corporal”3, nevertheless implemented a series of policies to their liking: He ended the 
border dispute with the NATO member Turkey, signed an armistice with Israel and 
indicated his willingness for peace talks in general. Equally important, he took strong 
actions against left-wing dissidents and approved a pipeline building project to pump oil 
from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean.4 Unfortunately, Zaim was overthrown and 
executed only five months after his accession to power. His successor was himself ousted 
from power by Colonel Adib Shishakli at the end of 1949.5  
American officials perceived Shishakli, who had established a military dictatorship by the 
end of 1951, as “not pro-Western in a full sense”6. Nevertheless, he “has been fairly 
                                                 
1 Douglas Little, 'Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945 -1958', Middle East Journal, 
44/1 (Winter 1990), pp.51-75. 
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cooperative with the US”7. On his tour through the Middle East in May 1953, John Foster 
Dulles met with the Syrian leader and gained the impression that Syria “is more aware of 
[the] Soviet threat”8 and, indeed, “offers some promise”9. Yet Shishakli was overthrown by 
Colonel Adnan Malki in early 1954. In the general elections held in September that year, 
the Ba‟ath10 and other left wing parties emerged as clear victors, with Khalid Bakdash 
becoming the first freely elected Communist Party deputy in the Arab world.11 
When Malki was assassinated in April 1955 and Syria was caught in a wave of anti-
Americanism, Washington considered it to be a “real danger that Syria will fall completely 
under left-wing control”12. The augmentation of the Soviet diplomatic corps in Damascus 
and a trade agreement signed between Syria and the Soviet Union in November 1955 
further alarmed officials in London and Washington.13 An unfriendly Syrian regime, they 
feared, might decide to manipulate the oil pipelines, thus depriving Western Europe of the 
desperately needed oil.  
In a meeting in October 1955, Secretary of State Dulles warned British officials that Syria 
“was the nearest of all the Arab states to becoming a Soviet puppet”14. By the end of January 
1956, Eisenhower and Foster Dulles discussed with Prime Minister Eden and Foreign 
Secretary Selwyn Lloyd possible means to instigate a coup in Syria.15  
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IV.2. The Cairo--Damascus connection 
The decision of the United States and Britain to effect a regime change in Damascus, 
however, was inextricably linked to developments in Cairo. Yet with regard to Egypt, British 
and American views were all but converging. 
The United States saw the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had seized power 
through a military coup in 1952,16 as “riding the crest of the wave of the future in the 
Middle East”17. In fact, the CIA helped Nasser to strengthen his position. By 1954, as 
Richard Aldrich observed, “the CIA was offering extensive intelligence support to Nasser‟s 
internal security forces”18. The Eisenhower administration was convinced that it was 
possible to establish a good working-relationship with the Nasser regime. The close 
partnership with Britain, however, was increasingly considered detrimental to America‟s 
standing among the Arab nations.19 Thus, Washington wanted to gain bona fides by ceasing 
to support its ally unconditionally in its dispute with Egypt over the evacuation of the Suez 
Canal base.  
The British genuinely wanted to withdraw their troops, but were only willing to do so 
provided that Egypt would agree to place the Suez Canal under international control, to 
join a Middle Eastern defence organisation and to permit Britain the right to reactivate the 
base in case of an emergency.20 Britain counted on American support in the negotiations, 
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but Egypt announced on 15 March 1953 that it would not allow US representatives to 
participate in the talks. Churchill wanted Eisenhower to put pressure on the Egyptians, yet 
the latter refused to act “against the wishes of the Egyptian Government”21. In fact, 
American officials felt that “the basic reason [of the conflict] is the „rigid‟ attitude of His 
Majesty‟s Government”22. Anglo-American tensions reached a climax during the tripartite 
summit in Bermuda in December 1953. In what Eden judged an “unsatisfactory talk”23, 
Dulles urged him to refrain from demanding any additional concessions from Cairo. In any 
case, the American Secretary of State informed him that “he did not see how US aid to 
Egypt could be delayed after 1 Jan[uary] 1954”24. Eventually, the British successfully 
prevented the US from giving aid to Egypt, yet they deeply resented the manoeuvrings of 
their American colleagues, which, they felt, had considerably weakened their position in the 
negotiations. When Egypt signed the final agreement on 19 October 1954, it did so without 
a pledge to participate in the Middle Eastern Defence Organisation (MEDO).25 In fact, 
Dulles had abandoned any hope that Egypt would join this Anglo-American model for 
regional defence when he toured the Middle East in May 1953. 26 Instead, he promoted to 
establish a defence system which would include countries of the “Northern Tier” – Turkey, 
Iraq, Pakistan and Iran – but exclude Egypt.27 
The US Chiefs of Staff still considered the defence of the Middle East to be a British 
responsibility. Other departments, however, lamented that British capabilities were “wholly 
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inadequate to defend the Middle East against Soviet aggression”28. The National Security 
Council therefore recommended that “[t]he United States should be prepared to play a 
larger role in safeguarding Western interests in the area”29. However, Washington still 
depended on Britain since the latter nonetheless dominated leading Arab countries like 
Iraq and Jordan.30 In January 1953, a National Intelligence Estimate warned that “a too 
rapid abandonment of British positions would leave a military vacuum which the US would 
have difficulty in filling”31. 
Britain, on the other hand, was fully aware of its declining capabilities. The Conservative 
Government tried to pass on the burden of defending the Middle East against Soviet 
aggression by arguing that the falls under the Truman doctrine and should therefore be 
primarily a US responsibility.32 Churchill, although considering it to be of “utmost 
importance to get America in”33, did, however, not intent to abandon Britain‟s position in 
the region. Instead, as David Lesch argues, the British aimed to “protect their specific 
interests in the Middle East under the cover of regional security”34.  
Britain and the United States thus depended on one another. Despite the worsening 
personal relationship between Dulles and Eden, and despite divergent appreciations of 
Nasser, Washington and London began to collaborate on a secret diplomatic effort to bring 
about a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute at the end of 1954. Washington feared that 
the ongoing conflict would further destabilise the Middle East which might “eventually 
[lead] to a situation in which regimes oriented toward the Soviet Union could come to 
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power”35. The conflict between Arabs and Israelis had also implications for US defence 
plans for the region: Although the impetus for the establishment of a Northern Tier 
defence alliance came from the US, they abstained from joining the Baghdad Pact.36 This 
agreement was signed between Britain, Iraq and Turkey in February 1955 as a first attempt 
to create such a defence system.37 Due to America‟s support for the creation of Israel and a 
strong Jewish lobby within the US, a settlement between Arabs and Israelis was a 
precondition for the United States to join any regional defence agreement.  
The covert plan code-named ALPHA envisaged to persuade Israel to make territorial 
concessions to the Palestinians, which, in turn, should persuade the Arab states to recognise 
the state of Israel. Nasser, however, was considered of great importance to the success of the 
plan, since he seemed to be the only Arab leader powerful enough to induce other Arab 
states to join and adhere to a peace agreement with Israel.38  
Yet Nasser would flatly disappoint those hopes. Worse, he effectively began to work against 
the Baghdad Pact. As one of the founding fathers of the non-alignment movement, Nasser 
claimed that any externally imposed military pact would undermine the autonomy of Arab 
states.39. In March 1955, Egypt, Syria and Saudi-Arabia signed an agreement to establish a 
joint Arab defence and economic co-operation, with the members obliging themselves not 
to join the Baghdad Pact.40 Furthermore, Nasser purchased arms from the Soviet bloc in 
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September the same year.41 Although deeply worried about those developments, at the 
beginning of 1956 London and Washington still considered Nasser‟s support vital for the 
success of ALPHA. By offering to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam, the United 
States tried to „bribe‟ Nasser into co-operation.42 
Nasser happily accepted the offer, yet it did not deter him from challenging Western 
interests in the region. American officials complained that “Nasser proved to be a complete 
stumbling block”43 with regard to project ALPHA, and primarily blamed him for its 
eventual failure in March. The British, on the other hand, were outraged when King 
Hussein of Jordan dismissed the British commander of the Arab Legion, Jordan‟s national 
army, General Sir John Bagot Glubb the same month. Anthony Eden, who had succeeded 
Churchill as Prime Minister in April the previous year, blamed Nasser to be responsible for 
this insult.44 
Thus, by March 1956 both the United States and Britain eventually concluded that it was 
impossible to work with Nasser and that he had to be weakened. Eden‟s Private Secretary 
Evelyn Shuckburgh noted in his diary on 8 March: “Today both we and the Americans 
really gave up hope of Nasser and began to look around for means of destroying him.”45 Yet, 
as Dulles had already told Eden and Selwyn Llyon during their meeting on 30 January, “if it 
should be decided to move against Nasser, it might be wise to consider Syria as well”46. 
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IV.3. Same ends, different means 
The project to destabilise Nasser, code-named Operation OMEGA, was authorised in an 
Anglo-American meeting at the White House on 28 March. Both London and Washington 
agreed that Nasser actually posed a threat to their interests in the Middle East. However, 
they disagreed on the extent of the danger and the measures be employed to deal with this 
danger.47  
The United States had a flexible approach to OMEGA and envisaged to bring Nasser down 
gradually, thus leaving him the opportunity to return to co-operation with the Western 
powers at any time, albeit the chances seemed increasingly remote.48 Eden, by contrast, had 
developed an actual anti-Nasser paranoia. After Glubb‟s dismissal, Eden shouted at the 
Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Anthony Nutting, in a telephone conversation that 
he wanted Nasser “destroyed”49. When British and American intelligence officials met for 
the first time to discuss the execution of OMEGA on 31 March and 1 April 1956, the head 
of MI6 George Young argued that the “elimination of Nasser”50 was necessary. As MI6 had 
learned from a source allegedly within Nasser‟s circle, the latter was aiming to form the 
“United Arab States”, which would be led by Egypt and seek full support of the USSR.51 
The CIA suspected that MI6 tried to manipulate them into an ill-conceived operation. Kim 
Roosevelt and the CIA station in Cairo still had excellent contacts to Nasser himself and 
they were sure that he intended none of this.52 
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Despite these differences, the secret Anglo-American planning continued. The actual 
“catalyst”, however, was Syria:53 Wilbur Eveland, a senior CIA official involved in the joint 
operation, concluded that in order to “forestall the SIS plan to eliminate the Egyptian 
president, the CIA had, apparently, compromised with an offer to consider joining in a 
Syrian coup.”54  
Although OMEGA mentioned to put “strong pressure on Syria”55, the Planning Group 
initially rejected the British plan code-named STRAGGLE to effect “a complete change of 
government in Syria” in collaboration with Iraq and other British assets within the 
country.56 Instead of a coup, it advocated the “gradual strengthening of Western-oriented 
groups in Syria with concurrent elimination of the leftist officer from the army”57. Kermit 
Roosevelt had explicitly warned of the risks entailed in an Iraqi-British attempt to overthrow 
the Syrian government. The State Department‟s staff paper, which John Foster Dulles 
eventually approved, however, did not contain any dissenting views regarding a regime 
change in Syria and thus gave green light to a coup.58 
In fact, Syria seemed to be on the verge of becoming a real Soviet Satellite: The Soviet 
Foreign Minister, Dmitri Shepilov, visited Damascus on 22 June 1956 and offered an arms 
deal similar to that the Egyptian government had secured the year before. In early July, Syria 
recognised Communist China.59 Wilbur Eveland was sent to Damascus on 24 July to confer 
with Mikhail el-Lian, a right-wing Syrian politician and the primary CIA asset in the 
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country.60 El-Lian told him that he would need “half-million and at least thirty days” to 
accomplish the task.61 The planning, however, was disturbed by Nasser‟s decision to 
nationalise the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956 in reaction to the withdrawal of the 
offer to finance the Aswan Dam on part of the United States and Britain.62 In September, 
the preparations for the Syrian coup were resumed. When the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal was discussed at the United Nations from 6 to 14 October, Foreign Office and MI6 
officials met with their American counterparts from the State Department and the CIA to 
plan further action against Syria. The target date for the execution of Operation 
STRAGGLE was set for 25 October.63 Details of the plan, however, are unavailable to this 
date. Gorst and Lucas suggest that American and British agents had established contacts to 
the right-wing Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), desert tribes and conspirators within 
the army, who were instructed to instigate a pro-Western coup, possibly with Iraqi help. 64  
On 18 October, el-Lian, the main contact to the executers of the coup, told Eveland that 
“his people weren‟t quite ready” and that the date for the coup had been postponed to 29 
October.65 It is unclear to this date whether the British had deliberately set the date to 
coincide with the Israeli invasion of Egypt – which eventually lead to the cancellation of the 
coup in Syria. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles discussed with his brother Allen Dulles, 
director of the CIA, the possibility of “re Straggling [sic]”66 the next day. By then, however, 
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the Syrian Intelligence Bureau had already uncovered the plot and began to break up the 
net of conspirators.67 
Britain‟s decision to secretly collaborate with Israel and France in a military coup against 
Nasser and the subsequent Suez War have been discussed at length elsewhere and shall not 
be repeated here.68 The United States fiercely condemned this act of nineteenth century 
imperialism and even applied economic sanctions against Britain.69 Anglo-American 
relations had reached a nadir, official communication was almost completely disrupted, 
with Eisenhower refusing to receive Eden in Washington later that month.70  
Communication, however, continued on the intelligence level. Lucas and Morey argue that 
the “CIA became the channel for communicating Washington‟s private position: the US 
would accept a fait accompli if the Suez Canal Zone was occupied quickly”71. In fact, the 
Americans also liked to see Nasser removed. Weeks before the invasion, Ike told his special 
counsel Bernhard Shanley – off the record of course: “I just can‟t understand why the 
British did not bump off Nasser. They have been doing it for years and then when faced 
with it they fumble [sic]”72. 
Douglas Little argues that there is “strong evidence that John Foster Dulles did discuss plans 
for a pro-Western coup in Egypt with top U.K. officials”73. On 20 September Dulles and 
Lloyd decided to set up “a very secret working party here to consider continuously economic 
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and political means of weakening and lessening the prestige of the regime of the regime of 
Colonel Nasser”74. Eden claims in his memoirs that he and Dulles agreed that their 
governments “should work out alone and in the utmost secrecy a means of bringing Nasser 
down”75. Earlier remarks by Dulles that “[a] way had to be found to make Nasser disgorge 
what he was attempting to swallow”76 made Eden belief that the United States would, at 
least tacitly, support an intervention when all other means were exhausted.77 However, he 
underestimated how unacceptable the use of force was to the Americans.78 Furthermore, the 
British did not take into account that a military intervention with far reaching international 
implications only days before the American presidential election would in any case infuriate 
their allies. 
The strong American condemnation, however, caught London by surprise, especially since 
Washington seemed to pursue a common aim. In mid-November, only a few days after the 
invasion, Foster Dulles asked Selwyn Lloyd – much to the annoyance and irritation of the 
latter: “Selwyn, why did you stop? Why didn‟t you go through with it and get Nasser 
down?”79  
The United States and Britain, thus, shared the objective of weakening – or even removing 
– the Egyptian leader. However, grave misunderstandings arose about the means to achieve 
those ends and about the timing. 
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IV.4. Covert action again 
The Suez Crisis was an enormous humiliation for Britain and eventually cost Eden his 
Premiership. It has had been interpreted as the „lion‟s last roar‟80 or Britain‟s last battle.81 
Despite attempts of a revisionist school of thought to downplay its significance 82, the 
majority of scholars still consider Suez a „watershed‟ for Britain‟s position in the Middle 
East.83 The harsh reaction on part of the United States had been interpreted by historians 
on both sides of the Atlantic as effort to finally discredit Britain as Great Power in the 
region.84 David Cameron Watt argued that the United States had deliberately tried to 
expunge the British presence in the Middle East.85 Max Beloff even argues that the special 
relationship was nothing but a myth.86  
When taking Anglo-American covert collaboration into account, however, the picture is 
quite a different one: It shows that Britain continued to have a significant influence in the 
Middle East and that the United States, far from aiming to discredit its ally in the region, 
continued to co-operate closely with Britain. Without doubt, the announcement of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine marked America‟s arrival as dominant power in the Middle East.  It 
offered American military aid to the states of the Middle East in defence against communist 
aggression.87 The US now seemed to pursue an independent policy in the region in order to 
forestall Soviet encroachment. And it seemed that Anglo-American relations were only 
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slowly recovering. At a conference on 20 March 1957 at Bermuda, Eden‟s successor Harold 
Macmillan met with Eisenhower and eagerly tried to revive the close partnership their 
countries had enjoyed in the past. Bermuda did indeed signal a rapprochement between the 
British and American governments. Differences over Middle Eastern policy, however, 
remained unresolved. The United States aimed to focus on Saudi Arabia as new Arab leader 
in order to counter Nasser‟s influence. This, however, endangered British interests in the 
Gulf.88 
Yet while government officials were discussing different approaches to Middle Eastern 
problems, collaboration between CIA and MI6 was flourishing behind the scenes. The 
targets for joint covert operations were Egypt and Syria again. Both Wilbur Eveland and 
Miles Copeland claim that by July 1957, American and British intelligence officials were 
actively plotting the overthrow of Nasser in an operation called SIPONY.89 Kermit‟s cousin, 
Archibald Roosevelt, who served as liaison officer between State Department and the CIA 
operators in Damascus, claimed that senior US government officials considered the “leftist 
coalition of forces supported by the Soviets [...] as a target legally authorized by statute for 
CIA political action”90. Nasser, however, remained in power until his death in 1970, so 
obviously the operation never bore fruits. 
In April and August 1957, the CIA also tried to instigate a coup in Syria, which, according 
to a Special Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), represented “an extremely promising target for 
Soviet efforts in […] in the Arab world”91 after Suez. The Syrian Prime Minister Quwatly, 
fearing an attack of British, French and Israeli forces on Syria as well, had gone to Moscow 
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at the height of the Suez Crisis in order to seek help. In the aftermath of Suez and with the 
plot uncovered, pro-Soviet elements began to consolidate their power in Syria.92 In the 
course of 1957, the country seemed to drift further into the Soviet camp, with the Ba‟ath 
Party being the most powerful party in both Cabinet and Parliament by January. 
Furthermore, Damascus openly rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine93 and signed an 
agreement for economic and technical aid with the Soviet Union on 6 August 1957, thus 
consolidating Syrian-Soviet relations.94 
On 13 August, the Syrian intelligence branch uncovered the CIA plot code-named 
WAPPEN to overthrow the government.95 Subsequently, American diplomats were expelled 
from the country.96 The situation in Syria seemed on the verge of chaos. Especially after an 
alleged communist was appointed commander-in-chief, Syria‟s neighbours expressed their 
concerns of a possible communist take-over and asked Washington for help.97  
In the midst of the Syrian crisis98 Washington actively sought the support of London. A 
vivid correspondence between Dulles and Macmillan developed in which the latter skilfully 
played up the danger of a communist coup in order to foster closer relations between the 
United States and Britain.99 Frederick Bishop, Macmillan‟s Principal Private Secretary, was 
sent to Washington in early September to discuss further co-operation with regard to Syria. 
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Following this visit, an Anglo-American Syrian Working Group (SWG) was established 
“where staff from the British Embassy could meet senior US officials from the State 
Department and CIA to exchange intelligence, review developments and make 
recommendations relating to the situation in Syria”100. In fact, the British were now 
restraining the Americans, who were seriously contemplating to encourage a Turkish 
invasion of Syria and subsequently sending in the Sixth Fleet. The final report produced by 
the SWG on 18 September, however, ruled out this possibility as being too risky. Instead, it 
promoted the so-called „preferred plan‟: Syrian tribes should be encouraged to stage fake 
border incidents which would serve as pretext for an invasion by Iraq, Jordan and possibly 
Lebanon. Additionally, unrest should be created within Syria that would eventually lead to 
the overthrow of the government.101 Interestingly, the plan, which was approved by high-
ranking British and American leaders, also called for a “special effort [...] to eliminate 
certain key individuals”102 in Syria. 
By early October, however, it seemed that the Arab states had second thoughts about the 
plan. The SWG then designed an alternative plan called „containment plus‟, which 
resembled the previously planned Operation STRAGGLE. Its execution, however, was 
hampered by the landing of Egyptian troops in Syria on 13 October. After Damascus had 
called on the United Nations, claiming that Turkey began amassing troops at its border, 
Nasser had seized the opportunity to demonstrate Syro-Egyptian solidarity.103 In February 
the next year, the United Arab Republic (UAR) was proclaimed, a federal union of Syrian 
and Egypt. Thus, the Syrian crisis ended rather unspectacularly. Damascus did not fall into 
Soviet hands, but Nasser was able to further consolidate his position as Arab leader – for 
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both London and Washington at least the lesser of two evils.104  
The SWG, however, did not only focus on Syria but took general events in the Levant into 
account. In a paper produced in October 1957 it analysed the best means to respond to 
possible future coups in Jordan and Lebanon.105 Following these recommendations, Britain 
and the United States began planning for a joint military action. Ivan Pearson argues that 
the military plan which had been developed in these joint sessions “bore a striking 
resemblance to the operation carried out in June 1958”, which would explain the swiftness 
of action taken at that time.106 
The SWG had offered an effective means for the United States and Britain to discuss 
problems and to find a common approach to solve them. In the following months, Jones 
argues, “the working group format became the favoured method for London and 
Washington of cementing their cooperation and policy coordination in a number of 
regional settings”107. By early 1959, however, the working groups were abandoned for the 
United States and Britain were now co-ordinating their policies on the highest levels.108  
                                                 
104 Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and Nasser, p.131. 
105 „XIX US-UK Precautions Against Coups d‟état in Jordan and Lebanon‟, 10 October 1957, PRO 
PREM11/2523 as referred to in Pearson, 'Syrian Crisis', p.56.  
106 Ibid.  
107 Jones, 'The 'Preferred Plan'', p.411. 
108 Matthew Jones, 'Anglo-American Relations after Suez, the Rise and Decline of the Working Group 
Experiment, and the French Challenge to NATO, 1957-59', Diplomacy & Statecraft, 14/2 (March 2003), pp.49-
79. 
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V. Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated that covert actions formed an integral part of the Anglo-
American strategy for the Middle East. Covert operations, which concealed joint Anglo-
American sponsorship, were considered as effective means to forestall Soviet penetration of 
the region without risking an all-out war. Furthermore, covert actions were also employed to 
deal with Arab nationalism when it endangered Western interests in the area.  
The analysis of covert actions, however, has also revealed new insights of Anglo-American 
relations in the Middle East. Despite serious conflicts and apparent disagreements, the 
United States and Britain actually collaborated closely on the intelligence level. They were 
not motivated by sentiments, but by their own interests. Although London and Washington 
often differed in their approaches to Middle Eastern affairs and held different priorities, 
they nevertheless shared a sufficient degree of common interests in the region.  
Initially, Britain tried to gain American support to uphold its own position. The United 
States were generally prepared to support Britain, particularly when they started to 
appreciate the strategic significance of the Middle East with the onset of the Cold War. 
Tensions, however, arose when Washington commenced to adopt a more independent 
policy in the Middle East vis-à-vis Britain. Haunted by the spectre of communism, the 
United States began to put pressure on Britain to find an amenable solution to the oil 
dispute with Iran.  
Despite different appreciations of the developments in Iran, Britain and America actually 
agreed on basic issues: A Soviet inroad into Iran had to be prevented and access to the oil 
had to be secured. Admittedly, the priorities differed and London might have been more 
worried about its own oil revenues than Mossadeq‟s alleged communist affiliations. 
Nevertheless, a common basis existed that revealed itself in the joint planning for a covert 
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action to remove Mossadeq from power. Operation AJAX in Iran was the starting point for 
the secret Anglo-American co-operation in the Middle East.  
Indeed, the intelligence co-operation can be considered as a manifestation of the special 
relationship. However, it was not only used by Britain in order to achieve own ends, as 
Reynolds asserted.1 As has been demonstrated above, Britain did not manipulate the 
United States to participate in the covert endeavour to topple the Mossadeq regime, since 
the Truman administration had independently been contemplating a similar move in the 
summer of 1952. In fact, the United States benefited the most from the intelligence co-
operation. By the time the oil dispute was finally settled, the United States had already 
began to take a more active role in Middle Eastern affairs, particularly when government 
officials widely acknowledged Britain‟s inadequate capabilities to defend the region on its 
own. Nevertheless, the UK retained a significant degree of power in the region, which the 
United States were unable to replace. Yet America‟s attempts to upgrade its own status in 
the region were severely hampered by its association with British colonialism. Covert 
intelligence co-operation, therefore, enabled the US to overcome this dilemma: It actually 
allowed them to nurture the special relationship with the UK while simultaneously 
distancing themselves publicly from the latter so as not to be identified with its reputation 
as colonialist power. 
Britain, by contrast, would have preferred a more open demonstration of the close alliance 
between London and Washington. The Conservative government, after winning the 
elections in 1951, tried more actively than their predecessors to get the United States 
involved in Middle Eastern affairs. Yet, as Prime Minister Eden complained to his 
predecessor, Winston Churchill: 
                                                 
1 Reynolds, ''Special Relationship''.  
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 “Although [the Americans] are willing to work closely with us 
in discussing common policies for the Middle East, it is difficult 
for them to admit publicly that they are doing so – especially in 
an election year ... Their unwillingness to let it be known that we 
are at one on this important issue diminishes the influence which 
each of us could exercise in the area.”2 
 
The general willingness on part of the United States to see Nasser weakened – over even 
removed – and the drastic measures they envisaged for Syria inclined Eden to think that the 
US would support their efforts. As outlined above, Washington did not oppose Britain‟s 
aim to remove Nasser. Douglas Little argues that “the nasty falling out between Britain and 
America during the Suez crisis stemmed at least in part from a misunderstanding about 
covert action”3.  The United States envisaged bringing Nasser down gradually by means that 
would conceal its sponsorship. Britain, however, reckoned that military force would be 
acceptable when all other means to solve the crisis were exhausted.  
After the Suez Crisis and the subsequent proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, it 
appeared that the United States would henceforth pursue a unilateral policy with regard to 
the Middle East. Yet as has been argued above, Britain continued to play a decisive role in 
Middle Eastern affairs – through collaboration in covert operations. There is some evidence 
indicating that CIA and MI6 were planning the overthrow of Nasser only months after the 
Suez invasion. Be that as it may, official documents definitely prove that by August 1957, 
British and American officials were closely collaborating on a plan to change the 
government in Syria by means of covert action. Stephen Blackwell argued that “the crisis 
over Syria in 1957 [...] was the most significant factor in the re-building of the „special 
relationship‟ after the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt”4.  
                                                 
2 Eden to Churchill, 21 April 1956, quoted in Lucas, Divided We Stand, p.123. 
3 Little, 'Mission Impossible', p.681. 
4 BLACKWELL, STEPHEN, 'Britain, the United States and the Syrian crisis, 1957', Diplomacy & Statecraft, 11/3 
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The establishment of the joint Syrian Working Group was an important factor in 
cementing the close relationship between London and Washington. Its focus went beyond 
events in Syria, but took general developments in the Middle East into account. Britain, 
although more in a role of junior partner, nevertheless played an important part in Middle 
Eastern affairs.  
 
It cannot be denied that the relations between London and Washington with regard to the 
Middle East were indeed characterised by tensions and conflict. The analysis of the secret 
dimension of intelligence co-operation, however, sheds a different light on Anglo-American 
relations in general and indicates that there was a considerable degree of collaboration and 
agreement. With regard to intelligence, the relations can indeed be considered special. Yet, 
as Dean Acheson put it, the unique relationship was not necessarily always an affectionate 
one.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
(2000), pp.139-58. 
5 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p.387. 
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